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RE SPONSE
POLITICS, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND THE THIN
CONSTITUTION
Mark Tushnet*
I. INTRODUCTION
Any author would be pleased at having his or her work taken as
seriously as mine has been by the contributors to this Symposium.
As I wrote in Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,' my
aim was not so much to place on the table a serious policy pro-
posal-elimination of judicial review-but rather was to broaden a
discussion about constitutionalism and judicial review that has been
far too narrow.2 For a decade or more, constitutional theory and
theorists have been overly concerned with questions about constitu-
tional interpretation that are the legacy of controversies over the
Warren Court's liberal activism.3 The advent of a new constitutional
era, characterized in part by conservative judicial activism, makes
it possible for someone with my political inclinations to pay
attention to the more fundamental questions of constitutionalism
that I sought to raise in Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts. Most contributors to this Symposium agree that the
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center; Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia University, 1999-2000. In addition to the
contributors to this Symposium, I would like to thank Michael Dorf, Jean Cohen, and other
participants in the Colloquium on Political Theory held at Columbia University on March 2,
2000, for comments that materially advanced my progress on the issues I discuss here.
1. MARK TUSHNET, TAKNG THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE CouRTs (1999).
2. See id. at 174 (asserting that "[t]hinking about a world withoutjudicial review" might
"contribute" to the goal of "distribut[ing] constitutional responsibility throughout the
population").
3. The time limit does not exempt my own contributions to those discussions. See MARK
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrrIcAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1988).
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questions I raise are worth more discussion than they have received
from most constitutional theorists. Most disagree with my answers
to some of the questions. But their engagement with my argument
advances the goal of discussing them, and that is more than I could
fairly have hoped for when I wrote the book.
In this response I do not intend to address all the interesting and
important observations made in this Symposium. It should come as
no surprise that I agree entirely with the comments praising the
book and particular arguments in it. It may come as a slight
surprise that I agree with many of the comments criticizing some of
my arguments. The criticisms are all respectful, and no one-or at
least not me-thinks that he or she gets everything right even after
thinking hard about the entire set of arguments for a rather
extended period. So, I take most of the criticisms as corrections to
an argument that is stronger for them. I will use this response,
then, to deal with some more general themes that occur in several
of my critics' comments, and to elaborate on the most serious
deficiency they have identified in Taking the ConstitutionAway from
the Courts-the less-than-complete description and defense of
thinning down the Constitution with which we today should be
concerned.
I begin by describing the audience for the book, as a way of
locating it politically. The sections that follow take up two related
themes. Section III describes the difference between a populist
constitutionalism and populist politics, bringing out the importance
of questions of national identity in my overall argument. Section IV
opens by addressing the concern that nonjudicial institutions need
supplementation if the thin Constitution's values are to be honored.
The answer it offers returns to the question of national identity
broached in section III.
II. LOCATING THE POLITICS OF TAING THE CONSTITUTIONAWAY
FROM THE COURTS
Professor Graber raises a serious question about the audience for
the book, but I think he misunderstands the politics that underlies
my endeavor.4 Professor Graber finds it peculiar that an academic
4. See Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 376
(2000). As a matter of personal privilege, however, I think it fair for me to note that my
inability to locate a trade press to publish the book says more about the politics of publication
at an elite university publishes a book urging-on whom?-some form
of populist politics.5 I am, frankly, baffled at the suggestion, if there
is one, that people who teach at elite universities are by that fact
disabled from seeing the merit of populist constitutionalism.6 I
would have thought that the point of being an academic was to
figure out what was "right" or "true." If populist constitutionalism
is right or true, I would think that it was the job of an academic to
say so, whether he or she teaches at an elite university or a
community college. We should therefore put aside Professor
Graber's odd comments about elite populism, and focus on the more
important point he makes, which is about the book's audience.
Professor Graber appears to believe that I wrote the book as a
political tract or "broadside," hoping to rally support among the
masses for abolishing judicial review and reasserting popular
control over the Constitution.' I cannot imagine why he might think
that. I am, as he stresses, a legal academic, not a political pamphle-
than it does about either my intentions or the book's merit. Not to be overly crude about it,
but I am confident that a trade press would have published the book, word for word, had I
been the subject of a heated public controversy and an extended Senate debate. Although I
have no knowledge about the matter, I am quite confident that no trade press would have
published the collected law review articles of Lani Guinier had she not satisfied those
conditions. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNEss IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994). This is such a collection, prefaced by a short memoir of
the controversy over Professor Guinier's aborted nomination to head the Justice Department's
Civil Rights Division, and which was published by the Free Press, a trade press. (I am
reminded of Bob Dylan's line: "There's no success like failure," although he also adds that
"failure's no success at all.") There is, I think, one qualification to this: Perhaps a trade press
would have published something not quite so far from the mainstream as my work. But,
again, my inability to locate a trade press willing to publish the book-and I looked for
one-says next to nothing about my intentions or politics.
5. See Graber, supra note 4, at 376.
6. I note as well that Professor Graber's misidentification of support for legal abortion
with support for abortion on demand weakens his claim that attending a fund-raising rally
in support of legal abortion is in tension with a commitment to populism. See Graber, supra
note 4, at 377. The abortion example crops up recurrently in Professor Graber's contribution.
All that I can say is that he is simply wrong in his claims regarding my views about
populism's relation to the abortion issue. I take comfort in the belief that the people, on
reflection, will not recriminalize abortion entirely. That belief is supported by the evidence
Professor Graber supplies in his book on the issue. See MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING
ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS (1996). But I
would remain a populist even if the people did so; I would then engage in political action to
reestablish the right.
Professor Graber's view that populist political action consists solelyin demonstrating,
marching, or gathering overlooks such things as the activities reasonably undertaken at
different periods in a person's life-cycle and opportunities for alternative forms of political
action. For the record, I have taken part in my share of demonstrations, marches, and the
like.
7. See Graber, supra note 4, at 376.
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teer, and I have the talents of the former and not the latter. Who,
then, was I writing for?
One group I had in mind in writing the book was conservatives
who had developed what they thought was a biting critique of
judicial activism. Of course my arguments were not cast in terms
designed to convert them to populism. I did hope to bring out the
hypocrisy of their purportedly populist attacks on judicial review by
showing that someone from the reasonably far Left could mount a
truly populist attack on the institution. And, to some degree, I
succeeded. An article in the neoconservative journal Commentary
was visibly uncomfortable with an attack on judicial review from the
Left, and in the end found itself forced to deny that I really did want
to eliminate judicial review.' Another conservative reviewer
addressed my argument on the merits, and found it wanting.'
I am pretty sure I understand why. The politics of attacks on
judicial review are reasonably straightforward. You can criticize the
courts on two grounds if you do not like what they are doing. You
can say that they are wrong, and you can say that they should not
be interfering with the judgments made by the people's representa-
tives in the legislatures.' ° During the Warren and Burger Court
years, conservatives tried to make both arguments, but the first one
did not have much purchase because the Court's decisions were, on
the whole, rather popular." (Consider here the Court's reapportion-
8. See Gary Rosen, Triangulating the Constitution, 108 COMMENTARY59 (July 1999). I
must add that Professor Lino Graglia, no hypocrite on this matter, responded sympathetically
to my argument in a letter to the editor published in a later issue of the magazine. See Lino
Graglia, Letter from Readers, 108 COMMENTARY 3 (Nov. 1999).
9. See SaikrishnaPrakash,America'sAristoracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (1999). I found
it amusing that Professor Prakash described Michael Stokes Paulsen's 142-page law review
article, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217 (1994), as a "better treatment" of the argument I made in
19 pages of the book. See Prakash, supra at 551 n.68; TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 6-26; see also
id. at 16 (citing Paulsen, supra). My book has 225 pages of text and endnotes; I can only
imagine how long it would have been had I developed each argument in it at law review
length. Of course Professor Paulsen's argument was "better" in the sense of more fully
developed; whether it would be "better" had it been part of a book is, I think, a rather
different question.
10. Charles Tiefer, in this Symposium, makes a similar point about the structure of
critical commentary on the Court. See Charles Tiefer, Comparing Alternative Approaches
about Congress's Role in Constitutional Law, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 489 (2000).
11. So much so that Alexander Bickel felt himself compelled to rethink the grounds of his
criticism of the Warren Court. See ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURTAND THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS 3-8 (1970) (continuing to criticize the Warren Court while acknowledging that
many of its most important decisions had the public's approval).
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ment decisions, 2 or its decisions establishing a high barrier to the
enactment or enforcement of laws discriminating against women. 3 )
Conservatives were thus driven to present their substantive
disagreements with the Warren and Burger Courts as grounded in
the second, populist critique of judicial review. But in the past few
years a conservative majority on the Supreme Court has been
making decisions that conservatives like.'4 Now a populist attack on
judicial review seems to conservatives like dirty pool: "We wanted
to take judicial review away from you, the liberals, but now that we
have succeeded, you want to take it away from us-and by using the
arguments we made against you. That's hardly fair."5 I have always
been uneasy with the aphorism that hypocrisy is the tribute that
vice plays to virtue, but maybe it is accurate here: Vice is judicial
review, virtue is the populist attack on judicial review, and hypoc-
risy is what conservatives have been engaged in.
Of course conservatives were not the primary audience I had in
mind in writing the book. But, Professor Graber to the contrary,
neither were Left-liberal political activists. 6 As Professor Graber
points out, the book is not written in a style congenial to political
12. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (Warren, C.J.) (holding that
Alabama legislature's apportionment plans were invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
in that the apportionment was not on a population basis).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (holding that "[plarties
who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for that action").
14. Two decisions early this term provide an instructive contrast. In upholding a federal
law limiting the circumstances under which state motor vehicle authorities could disclose
information on drivers' licenses, Chief Justice Rehnquist sounded the populist anti-judicial
review theme: "We of course begin with the time-honored presumption that the [statute] is
a 'constitutional exercise of legislative power. Reno v. Condon, 120 S.Ct. 666, 670 (2000)
(quoting Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466,475 (1883)). The daybefore, however, the
Court had invalidated a statute imposing monetary liability on state agencies that violated
laws against discrimination on the basis of age, and with not a word said about a presumption
of constitutionality nor any deference whatever to Congress's populist or fact-finding
credentials. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 649-50 (2000).
15. Again as somethinglike a point ofpersonal privilege, I note that I myselfwas making
arguments against judicial review before conservatives had reliably gained control of the
Court, and was chastised by people on the Left for doing so. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984). It is of course true, however, that my critique is offered
from a Left perspective, and that I hope that the populist constitutionalism I advocate would
advance progressive goals. But, as I discuss more fully below, I do not believe that progressive
outcomes are guaranteed.
16. It may be worth noting that I expressly disclaimed the position that Left-liberals
should relinquish their commitment to judicial review in a sort of unilateral disarmament.
See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 175 ("Unilateral disarmament is rarely a good idea.... The
only way to make sure that both sides disarm completely is to amend the Constitution.").
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activists. 7 The arguments are too abstract, the examples too
esoteric. More important, though, few political activists are
committed to judicial review in principle. They go to court when
they think they can get something out of the courts, and they go
elsewhere when their strategic calculations tell them they have a
better chance there. The only thing such activists would have to
worry about if my arguments began to affect actual practices is that
I might be taking away from them one weapon, out of many, that
they occasionally find useful.
My argument has only two quite modest things to say to political
activists who see the courts as strategic assets. First, they may be
overlooking some adverse ideological costs to leftist programs from
the courts' commitment to the individualist ideals that characterize
American rights-based constitutional adjudication. But those costs
are likely to be small. Second, the activists may not fully appreciate
that their opponents also find occasionally the same weapon they do.
Professor Mandel offers the strongest version of this point when he
argues that judicial review, examined over the course of constitu-
tional history, has been on balance a bad thing for political activists
on the Left."8 My evaluation of judicial review is that it has not been
quite as bad as that. As I put it, judicial review has been basically
"noise around zero," a sort of random disruption of the results
achieved in the fora of nonjudicial politics.' 9 If I am right, progres-
sive political activists should take into account the risk that their
opponents benefit more from judicial review than leftists do.
Because the risk is not that large, however, the progressives'
strategic calculations probably ought not change dramatically.
So, again, for whom is the book written? Well, academics,2 ° I
suppose (and say at various points in the book).2' Is there anything
peculiar about a populist academic writing a book whose intended
audience is other academics? I have already given one reason to
think not: My job includes making good arguments about constitu-
tional law, and I think the arguments in Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts are good ones. So what if only other academics
17. See Graber, supra note 4, at 376.
18. See Michael Mandel, Against Constitutional Law (Populist or Otherwise), 34 U. RICH.
L. REV. 443, 444-46 (2000).
19. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 153.
20. I define academics here to include students as well as people with jobs teaching them.
21. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 174 ("A modest conclusion, perhaps, but probably
the only one an academic's analysis can provide. What a political leader might do is, of course,
another question.").
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read the book? Of course I would like the book to have some effects
on constitutional policy, because, again, I think the arguments I
made are good arguments and I think that it would be nice if good
arguments had some effects. But I am not so deluded as to think
that there is anything like a direct line between making a good
argument and having some effects on policy.2
2
One final point about audience and style: As Professor
Michelman's contribution to this Symposium makes clear,23 I think
it mistaken to regard my argument as culminating in a serious
policy proposal to eliminate judicial review by constitutional
amendment. But, after all, I did make such a proposal. Why? As
Professor Graber suggests, my primary aim was to open up a
conversation about some fundamental aspects of constitutionalism
and politics, not to influence constitutional politics in any direct
way.2' Once opened up, the conversation might conclude that some
other policy changes were more attractive: term limits forjudges, for
21example, or an override mechanism like that in Canada's
Charter.2 1 Professor Hirschl's comparative perspective is particu-
larly helpful in suggesting alternative constitutional policies.2' As
Professor Manders comments on the Canadian system suggest, with
respect to each policy proposal, we would have to examine the
politics associated with the proposal and the politics that might
arise were the policy to be implemented.2' The latter, counterfactual
inquiry is of course likely to be quite difficult (and controversial), as
the book's sketch of a world without judicial review suggests.
22. I therefore agree with Professor Mandel to the extent that he disagrees with the view
that arguments against judicial review constitute a complete political strategy for weakening
an institution that was created and persists because it advances particular political interests.
I would not, however, rule out the possibility that such arguments might be a useful
component of a broader political strategy in appropriate circumstances.
23. See Frank I. Michelman, Populist Natural Law (Reflections on Tushnet's "Thin
Constitution"), 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 461 (2000).
24. See Graber, supra note 4, at 377 n.24. Again, Professor Graber inexplicably seems to
think that having such an aim is somehow in tension with adhering to a populist
constitutionalism.
25. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 569 n.31. The cynic in me whispers in my ear that this
proposal originates in the author's coming to realize that conservative Republicans do not
have a lock on the presidency (and that well-funded conservative demagogues are likely to
do reasonably well in judicial elections, perhaps better than they would in the aggregate
under the present system). The cynic's view might be rejected on the basis of the details of
Prakash's proposal, but he does not provide any.
26. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 127.
27. See Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, LookingBackwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial
Review vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415 (2000).
28. See Mandel, supra note 18, at 446-49.
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Professor Graber would expand our vision even further, to include
proposals for political reform that might advance a thicker populist
agenda than the one I describe.29 I have no quarrel with his
observation that eliminating judicial review would not reduce the
advantages elites have in nonjudicial fora, nor with his observation
that those advantages should be as troublesome to a populist
constitutionalist as judicial review is to me.3 ° But I am a legal
academic, writing about what I know. It is hardly the case that
every author must take on every aspect of every issue relevant to
the one he or she chooses to write about.
Walking home from work, I sometimes let my thoughts wander
and spell out a social theory that describes how my good ideas might
work their way into the policy universe. Usually, though, by the
time I get home, I understand that the most that can be said for my
work is that it is right. And I am satisfied with that.
III. POPULIST CONSTITUTIONALISM AND (OR VERSUS) POPULIST
POLITICS
In different ways Professors Graber and Mandel question the
coherence of a defense of populist constitutionalism that is distinct
from a populist politics. In writing Taking the Constitution Away
from the Courts I was quite conscious of my decision to refrain from
identifying the political positions I hold with the outcomes I believed
would occur in a populist constitutionalist system. I made that
decision primarily because of my belief that constitutional theory
has been degraded by the nearly universal practice of creating
theories that map almost precisely on to the political outcomes the
theorist desires.3 As I suggest in the book, some degree of overlap
is inevitable: One would have to be a lunatic to adopt an interpretive
theory that systematically produced outcomes one found morally
outrageous, at least as long as a plausible alternative theory with
less unattractive results was available. And some degree of
discrepancy is probably inevitable also, if only to preserve some
29. See Graber, supra note 4.
30. See id. at 378.
31. Probably the most notable recent example is Michael McCormell's strenuous effort to
defend Brown-v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), on originalist terms. See Michael
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953 (1995). In
the course of that defense, Professor McConnell relies heavily on a form of subsequent
legislative history that originalists usually (and properly, given their general theory) disclaim.
See id.
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credibility to the claim that one is articulating a constitutional
theory that is in some significant sense different from one's political
commitments. Still, the large degree of overlap and the small
amount of discrepancy in most academic writing on constitutional
theory is striking.
In contrast, my populist constitutionalism was designed to make
possible large differences between my own views about good public
policy and the outcomes that might occur in a populist constitution-
alist system. My thought was that I could then preserve a signifi-
cant domain for politics itself. Reflecting on the comments made by
Professors Graber and Mandel, I have concluded that the distinction
I sought to draw between a populist constitutionalism and populist
politics is thinner than I had hoped. It does exist, however.
Professor Graber's excursion into the history of populism in the
United States is interesting, but, I think, largely offthe point, as his
remarks near the conclusion of his contribution suggest.32 He may
want to define populism to be identical with the program of the
Populist Party of the 1890s, including producerism and protestant
religiosity.3 He offers no reasons for doing so, however. One
could-and I did-use an idea of populism that is, once again, thinner
than the specific commitments of any self-identified populists:
Populism for me means the enactment into public policy of the
people's views, whatever they happen to be. Producerism could be
a specific version of populism, as could, more broadly, a political
stance in which all that mattered was the people's unreflective will.
But the kind of commitment to constitutional values that I attribute
to the people of the United States can also be populist.34
Professor Graber's more interesting questions go to the relation
between the thin Constitution and the democratic values associated
with political participation. He points out that I do not defend
participation as valuable in itself, that is, as an important means of
32. See Graber, supra note 4, at 411.
33. See id. at 386-87
34. For this reason I do not quite understand Professor Graber's attribution to me of the
view that populism is fine because it matters "only when different institutional forms are
likely to yield similar results." Id. at 378. At most, I think, he can find in the book my hope
that the people adhere to the thin Constitution's values, but I am reasonably explicit in
asserting that, should things turn out otherwise, I would still adhere to my populism unless
a real disaster loomed. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 31 ("Of course if democracy regularly
produced disagreeable results, or occasionally produced truly vile ones, I would rethink my
commitment to democracy"; this clearly implies that I would retain my commitment to
democracy if it occasionally produced disagreeable but not truly vile results.).
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improving our capacity as humans, nor as instrumentally valuable,
that is, as a way of maximizing the chances that particular pro-
grams will be adopted.35 I do talk about the value of participation,
however, albeit in perhaps idiosyncratic terms. For me participation
is valuable because it is one of the ways in which we define our-
selves as a people. Populist constitutionalism is the way we explore
our national self-identity in the political realm.36 And, for me,
institutions that enable such explorations are valuable.
We can begin to see the relation between populist consti-
tutionalism and national self-identity by noting a problem with
what I have written so far. Assume that the people of the United
States are committed to implementing their desires or interests in
a way compatible with the thin Constitution. Assume as well, as I
do, that the thin Constitution covers an extremely wide domain of
politics-albeit, of course, thinly.37 Together these assumptions imply
that the thin Constitution will be implicated in nearly every political
decision-perhaps not in the decision whether to build one dam
rather than another or to close one military base rather than
another, but certainly in the decision to spend money on dams
rather than on military preparedness. Have I not squeezed out all
the space that politics could occupy in attempting to preserve a large
domain for it?
I think not. Populist constitutionalism is, in the end, about the
nature of the American people. Perhaps it is true that nearly every
political decision could be discussed in terms of the thin Constitu-
tion: We can always ask, "Will reducing military preparedness or
expanding natural resource conservation promote the thin Constitu-
tion's values?" And, questions like that will be beneath the surface
all the time to the extent that the people are committed to the thin
Constitution. Usually they will not be asked. Resource allocation
decisions will be made on the basis of pure policy concerns such as
efficiency or, more generally, the people's unreflective will.
35. See Graber, supra note 4, at 390.
36. Again, I make no claim that populist constitutionalism is the only way we do so. It is
the way of doing so that an academic lawyer like me finds easiest to talk about.
37. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 169-72 (describing the political implementation of
constitutional social-welfare rights associated with the thin Constitution).
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Sometimes, however, a political leader will see advantage in
raising the question: "What kind of people are we if we ... ?""
Populist constitutionalism, that is, is always ready to be deployed
in any political controversy. In that sense the distinction between
populist constitutionalism and ordinary politics is quite thin. But we
can still maintain a practical difference between populist
constitutionalism and populist politics because populist constitu-
tionalism will not always be deployed-and sometimes, when it is,'
the political leader who tries to do it will be ineffective. We engage
in populist politics when we seek to discover and implement the
people's will. We operate in the constitutionalist mode when we self-
consciously reflect on the relation between the programs we are
pursuing-the people's will-and the nature of our national identity.
Providing an academic's view of such self-conscious reflection is no
easy task, as I argue in the next section.
IV. THE SELF-LIMITING AND SELF-DEFINING ASPECTS OF THE THIN
CONSTITUTION
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts argues against
judicial review,"9 but not against constitutionalism. It explores what
Professor Michelman has called the paradox of democratic
constitutionalism: Democracy requires that we be self-governing,
38. My emphasis throughout the book on the role of political leaders in populist
constitutionalism shows that I do not identify populism with some undifferentiated mass of
'The People." It also shows, I believe, that populist constitutionalism is a form of politics, an
activity that always involves a distinction between political leaders and the general citizenry.
39. I confine to this footnote my disagreement with Professor Whittington's arguments
that judicial review can serve as a valuable safety net or the venue for sober second-thought.
See Keith E. Whittington, Herbert Wechsler's Complaint and the Revival of Grand
Constitutional Theory, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 507, 538 (2000). I argued in Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts that these arguments, while correct within their limited
domain, do not overcome the difficulties associated with judicial review. On the safety-net
metaphor: Sometimes legislatures fling things off the high platform, and properly so; these
discarded programs ought to crash to earth. But the courts, acting as a safety net, might
perpetuate the programs. The real question is whether the courts save enough things from
crashing to earth that ought to be saved, relative to bouncing back things that ought to be
discarded. Professor Whittington's assertion about the value of the safety net thus needs a
more comprehensive defense. On the sober second-thought idea: Here too the problem is that
the courts may require a second thought when the first one was perfectly fine. With respect
to both arguments, what we need to know is the degree to which the courts demand a second
thought or act as a safety net when they should, the degree to which they do so when they
should not, and the importance of the issues in both categories. My general claim about
judicial review is that courts are not a particularly valuable safety net or venue for a sober
second thought, taking everything into consideration.
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but constitutionalism limits what we can do in the course of
governing ourselves.4 ° I offered populist constitutionalism as a way
of creating a system of self-monitoring self-government. 4' The
difficulty with judicial review, on this conception, is that it cannot
readily be described as "self'-monitoring.42 In contrast, representa-
tive institutions can be so described, subject to Professor Graber's
clearly correct observation that elites play a distinctive role in those
institutions too.
43
As Professors Tiefer and Devins both emphasize, I spend some
time trying to determine the extent to which our existing nonjudicial
institutions can perform the task of self-monitoring.44 Both agree
that constitutional theory would benefit from a closer examination
of existing nonjudicial practices implicating the Constitution, and
both agree that those practices, both legislative and executive, look
better than many constitutional theorists assume before they have
done the empirical work.4 5 But no one could sensibly contend that
monitoring by Congress and the Executive themselves would
produce results identical to those produced by judicial monitoring.
How serious would the differences be?
40. See FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 5-6 (1999).
41. I draw this helpful phrase from comments on Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts offered by political scientist Jean Cohen at the Columbia Colloquium on Political
Theory, March 2, 2000.
42. Except insofar as a democratic people accepts judicial review as part of their own
system of self-monitoring, a possibility I discuss in my book. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at
173-74.
43. See Graber, supra note 4, at 377.
44. See Neal Devins, Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial
Presidency, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 359, 367-69 (2000); Tiefer, supra note 10, at 493-94.
45. Professors Tiefer, Devins, and I all focus on nonjudicial practices in the national
government. One could fairly ask whether the picture is the same at the state and local level.
I do not know of any useful works systematically examining those practices. For myself, I
have a fairly formalistic response to those who think that, whatever the case with respect to
actions by the national government, judicial review is needed to deal with state and local
legislation, likely to be the product of processes even less respectful than national ones of
constitutional values. As Professor Whittington anticipates, that response is that the national
government clearly has the power to displace unconstitutional state laws and local
ordinances, pursuant to its enumerated powers interpreted properly (that is, in light of the
thin Constitution's principles, and not as the Supreme Court interpreted them in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). Congress's capacity to do so is obviously limited, but
we could easily design administrative mechanisms to perform this surveillance function. The
administrative body would be somethinglike James Madison's Council of Revision, a proposal
the Constitutional Convention rejected. Even taking originalism into account, however, one
might note that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment changed the nature of American
federalism in ways that make a Council of Revision focused on adherence to fundamental
constitutional norms more compatible with federalism today than it would have been in 1789.
THIN CONSTITUTION
Professor Devins suggests that the degree of monitoring would
drop dramatically, for two reasons. First, the Executive's ability to
take the initiative would lead presidential positions to overwhelm
congressional ones,46 and the Executive's internal monitor, the
Office of Legal Counsel, would be even more vigorous in defending
Executive prerogatives if it did not have to take judicial doctrine
into account.47 Second, and in my view more important, monitoring
for constitutionality is not politically attractive.48 Here Professor
Devins points to the difficulty congressional leaders have in
attracting legislators to serve on the Judiciary Committees,
especially legislators representative of the range of ideological views
within each party's caucus.49
The counterfactual nature of my argument poses an obvious
difficulty at this point. I have no way of establishing that Professor
Devins is wrong. I would note several things, however. The relative
power of Congress and the President has changed over time, with
Congress sometimes more powerful than the President, sometimes
less. Perhaps there has been a permanent shift in power in the
direction of the Presidency, but I would like to see a more thorough
defense of that proposition before I yielded.50 The Office of Legal
Counsel is a bear about protecting presidential authority, and it
might be even more forceful if it did not have to take judicial
doctrine into account. But it is not clear to me that it has an
institutional interest one way or the other about the thin Constitu-
tion's values. In the end, what I am concerned with is the degree to
which the institutions of the national government monitor their own
behavior with respect to those values. I am not yet convinced that
even a permanent accretion of power to the Presidency would have
substantial effects on the ability and willingness of Congress and
the Presidency to monitor behavior affecting those values.
46. See Devins, supra note 44, at 368.
47. See id. at 370-71.
48. See id. at 365-67.
49. See id.
50. Even the obvious point that the President gained a great deal of power in areas
related to national security after World War II may have less force after the end of the Cold
War. More generally, political scientists seem to have established that Congress delegates
less authority to Presidents during periods of divided government, and that we are likely to
experience divided government for the foreseeable future. On delegation, see generally DAVID
EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLoRAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS
APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999). On divided government see
generally MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GovERNiENT (2d ed. 1996).
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The counterfactual problem is even more serious with respect to
Professor Devins's point about the Judiciary Committees. 5' They
may be unattractive today, given their responsibilities. But perhaps
they would be more politically attractive if they served as gatekeep-
ers for all legislation, as the House Rules Committee does. Or each
house might create a new Committee on the Constitution, assigned
the task of allowing legislation to proceed to floor debate only if the
committee certified that there were substantial grounds for
believing that the legislation was constitutional.2 I do not know
enough about the political incentives within Congress to know
whether serving on such a committee would be politically attractive,
indifferent, or unattractive. Perhaps such committees would be
political plums in a world where the only monitoring occurred
within the nonjudicial branches, and where the people were
concerned about constitutionality.
In the end, however, it is hard to make progress in thinking
through a counterfactual where something as basic to existing
practices as judicial review is taken out of the system. Professor
Devins might be right in thinking that eliminating judicial review
would reduce the effectiveness of self-monitoring.53 I am more
hopeful. In part my hopes derive from the very thinness of the
Constitution whose implementation needs self-monitoring. It is to
a defense of the thin Constitution I now turn.
My critics offer two challenges to my identification of the thin
Constitution with a narrative of the nation's identity. The thin
Constitution, they say, is so thin-anorexic, to use one critic's
term54-that it cannot do any work at all. One might take Professor
Michelman as suggesting that the thin Constitution, as I describe
it, is no different from the commitments all democrats have to self-
government subject to the rule of law. How, the critics ask, can that
Constitution contribute to the construction of a distinctively
American national self-identity? Professor Mandel offers a second
kind of criticism. The thin Constitution is, one might say, too
51. See Devins, supra note 44, at 365-66.
52. Other, mostly parliamentary systems have such constitutional committees. I define
the task of the committees as relatively limited-not determining constitutionality, but
certifying a substantial basis for believing that a proposal is constitutional-to ensure that the
constitutional issues are debated widely in Congress.
53. See Devins, supra note 44.
54. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 543. I must note that I remain troubled by what seem
to me the sexist overtones of Prakash's term.
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happy.55 Saying that the national self-identity of the people of the
United States consists in the principles of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution's Preamble overlooks the
nation's sorry history of slavery, racism, nativism, imperialism-and
the list goes on." Further, the retrospective nature of the construc-
tion of narratives of continuity might be thought to give my
approach an undesirable attachment to the status quo. And its
emphasis on national identity might generate an unattractive
nationalistic identity-politics.57 I believe that Taking the Constitu-
tion Away from the Courts anticipated and, in my view, met these
criticisms.
To explain why, I think it appropriate to step back to outline the
argument that culminates in my concern about national self-
identity. As Professor Whittington points out, the underlying
question is about constitutionalism itself: If we are to be a self-
governing people, why should we accept any limits on our ability to
govern ourselves?5" Two standard answers can, I think, be put aside.
Sometimes we limit ourselves because, knowing ourselves fairly
well, we can predict that we will make errors of judgment about
what is best for us. Constitutional limitations aimed at identifying
areas of predictable misjudgment serve the interests we actually
have, and so are consistent with our desire to govern ourselves in
accordance with those interests. In addition, sometimes we limit
ourselves because we know that spending political time and energy
on a particular issue will disable us from addressing a broad range
of other issues, in the practical sense that political time and energy
are limited. So, for example, we might know that we would spend
ninety percent of our political time and energy debating some issue
about religious establishment. We probably would arrive at no
stable conclusion about that issue. And having spent so much time
and energy on it, we would not have enough left over to deal with
questions about regulating the economy, the environment, and
more-questions as to which we might actually come to some
conclusions.
55. See Mandel, supra note 18, at 453.
56. See id.
57. One might, for example, see this risk realized in Justice Scalia's racialization of
national identity, when he wrote, "In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is
American." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
58. See Whittington, supra note 39, at 536-37. Professor Whittington limits his
observations to the case in which a people chooses to have a written constitution. See id.
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These are good arguments for a certain kind of self-limitation, but
not one that helps us understand U.S. constitutionalism. The
problem is that they explain why we might want to limit ourselves,
but they do not explain why we ought to take seriously the limita-
tions imposed on us by prior generations. The basic problem is
straightforward.59 The Constitution's framers in 1789 and its
amenders in later years might well have known the distinctive risks
of misjudgment run by the people of those times, but they could not
have known the distinctive risks of misjudgment that we today run.
Similarly, they might have done quite a good job in identifying the
issues that would be too divisive in 1789, but there is little reason
to think that those same issues have the same diversionary
potential today. The result is that the Constitution will bar us from
making decisions that we could make quite well, and from dealing
with issues that are no longer divisive. And it may allow us to make
decisions where our judgments are predictably bad (from our own
perspective) and may not bar us from taking up political time and
energy on issues that have become divisive since the Constitution
was written.6 °
A third standard answer to the question of justifying limits on
self-government is that we have rights that are either essential to
the preservation of self-government or are fundamental human
rights independent of their connection to self-government. So, for
example, we cannot have a system of self-government unless we
have rights to expression, to political participation, to equality, and
to autonomy. 61 Or, whether or not we are concerned with self-
government, human beings have rights to autonomy by virtue of our
humanity. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts addressed
briefly the problem of a rights-based justification for limitations on
our ability to govern ourselves: There is reasonable disagreement
about what the real content of those rights is, and that disagree-
ment can only be resolved by political processes if we are to remain
59. With a qualification noted infra in note 60.
60. The qualification to all this is that we might independently conclude that past
judgments about misjudgment and divisiveness remain valid. Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at
39-40 (discussing the "James Madison was a smart guy" argument). Then, however, the fact
that the judgments were made in the past carries no independent weight. We are deciding for
ourselves to limit our own action, and that is not inconsistent with self-government.
61. Rights to autonomy are connected to self-government because self-government would
be illusory if a majority at one moment could enact legislation that precludes potential
dissidents from having the mental space within which they could develop dissenting views.
See id. at 158.
self-governing.6 2 No harm is done in asserting that we have rights
of the relevant sorts, but the most we are going to be able to do is
identify the rights quite abstractly. We will be able to say,
uncontroversially, that a democratically self-governing people must
have and respect rights of free expression and equality, for example,
but we are not going to be able to say that laws against flag-burning
as a means of political protest, or affirmative action programs, are
inconsistent with those rights. In short, the rights we uncontro-
versially have are precisely the ones I have identified with the thin
Constitution.63
A rights-based argument of the sort I outlined in the preceding
paragraph resolves the paradox of democratic constitutionalism
quite generally. The U.S. Constitution enters the argument only
because it happens to refer explicitly to the rights at issue. But,
those rights inhere in all democratic systems of self-government. 64
I think that this is the ground that, according to Professor
Michelman, connects my analysis to that of John Rawls.65
I could leave the argument here, because it would have estab-
lished the relevance-indeed, I think, the exclusive relevance-of the
thin Constitution to a system of self-monitoring self-government.
But I am bothered by the fact that the rights-based argument is one
about constitutionalism generally, and not about whatever might be
62. See id. at 157-63.
63. I give essentially the same response to the argument that the Constitution serves a
valuable coordination function. We need some way, for example, to pick members of the
House of Representatives. Any way is arbitrary to some extent, but the one specified in the
Constitution is at least as good as any other. The thick Constitution addresses the
coordination problem. And interesting issues arise, as with the Emoluments Clause problem
I discuss in the book, when someone claims that the thick Constitution impedes advancing
the thin Constitution's goals. See id. at 33-36.
64. See Hirschl, supra note 27. Professor Hirschl commends attention to constitutional
law in systems other than the United States, a recommendation that is particularly valuable
at this point in the argument, because the argument suggests that we should be able to locate
thin constitutional rights in all democratic constitutional systems. In this connection, I have
regularly adverted to Australian Capital Television Proprietary Ltd. v. Commonwealth of
Australia, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106 (Austl.). The case involved a constitutional challenge to
Australia's system ofcampaign finance, which the High Court understood to give a systematic
advantage to the major incumbent parties. See id. at 107. Australia does have a constitution,
but its drafters consciously omitted protections for free expression and equality rights of the
sort relevant to addressing such a challenge. Nonetheless, the High Court found the statute
unconstitutional, with the predominant view being that inequality in campaign finance was
inconsistent with the nation's commitment to democracy. See id. at 107-08.
65. See Michelman, supra note 23, at 487. 1 feel compelled to note that sometimes, when
I read Professor Michelman's contribution to this Symposium, I think that he has described
quite accurately the logic of my argument, and that at other times I think he has made it
better than it really is.
20001 TBIN CONSTITUTION 561
562 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:545
distinctive about the U.S. form of constitutionalism.66 Saying why
the U.S. Constitution is distinctive leads us, finally, to the thin
Constitution as an expression of a narrative of national continuity.
Consider again the proposition that constitutionalism makes
sense when it is understood to consist in self-imposed restrictions on
self-government. My objections to restricting us by decisions made
by a prior generation was that those decisions could not readily be
described as "our" decisions. But perhaps they can be so described.
What is needed is some account that connects us to the people who
made the decisions. Somehow, "they" have to become "us."
It is at this point that narratives of national continuity enter.
"They" will be "us" if we understand ourselves to be part of the same
nation-even though many years have passed, even though the
activities of the governmental entity called "the United States of
America" does very different things today from what it did then,
and, most important, even though many of us have no genetic
connection whatever to the people who adopted the Constitution.
Narratives of national continuity provide us with the resources to
develop that understanding. The thin Constitution-referring
specifically to the U.S. Constitution-becomes our Constitution
rather than a mere example of some generic constitutionalism once
we do so.
Several points about the construction of these narratives seem
worth making explicit. The narratives are constructions. And they
are contemporary constructions, stories someone today tells about
the kind of people we have been and are. Narratives of national
continuity are not objective accounts of what really happened.
Further, a wide range of possible narratives of national continuity
are available at any time. On what basis should we choose among
66. Obviously the thick Constitution is distinctive: Perfectly decent constitutional systems
exist without an Emoluments Clause, for example. Perhaps, as one passage in Professor
Whittington's contribution suggests, one could talk about the distinctiveness of the U.S.
Constitution by bifurcating it. See Whittington, supra note 39, at 534 ("Tushnet seems so
concerned with the process of ideological nation-building and citizenship that he loses track
of the actual structures of governance."). The Constitution of rights, thinly specified, is a
version of democratic constitutionalism generally, while the thick Constitution is the
distinctively American institutionalization of democratic constitutionalism. My difficultywith
such an approach is captured by the observation that it has no room for treating Abraham
Lincoln as someone who spoke deeply about the distinctive U.S. Constitution. The bifurcation
strategy cannot comfortably deal with Lincoln's constitutionalism, which was about rights,
not about particular institutions, and was also about American constitutionalism as a
distinctive practice.
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the available narratives? As Professor Michelman suggests," I think
we ought to choose the one that is most attractive, in the sense that
it provides the best account of a normatively attractive project that
can be fairly attributed to the people of the United States extended
over time. I acknowledge here, although I did not do so in the book,
that the weakest part of my argument is my endorsement of a
specific narrative. I assert, without providing evidence, that the
people of the United States are in fact committed to the value-based
system that I associate with the thin Constitution. One would draw
different conclusions, or find a different narrative of national
continuity more attractive, were my factual claims proven false.
Finally, and for me most important, the construction of a narrative
of national continuity allows us to develop a theory of American
constitutionalism as a species of constitutionalism more generally.
Professor Whittington questions whether the thin Constitution,
understood in the way I have presented it, is law in any meaningful
sense.68 He is of course correct in saying that the Constitution's
adopters did not think that the Preamble and, more broadly, the
principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence were law
in the conventional sense.69 But, of course, Professor Whittington
does not rely heavily on this originalist point. It may be that our
disagreement is simply only of terminology: I am willing to say, with
Dworkin,° that the principles that animate our interpretation and
application of what is uncontroversially law are also part of the law,
while Professor Whittington may want to maintain a distinction
between those principles and the law itself. For him, law must have
a "fairly thick" content if it is to perform the task of settling
disputes. At this point, I think we face a simple but deep jurispru-
dential divide. I regard myself as a legal realist to the bone, and my
legal realism tells me that no law, no matter how thick, can settle
disputes in the way that Professor Whittington requires." So, for
me, it is precisely true that, to take Professor Whittington's example
discussing my treatment of the "Mitchell problem," a Senator who
disregards the Emoluments Clause acts in accordance with law, as
67. See Michelman, supra note 23.
68. See Whittington, supra note 39, at 533.
69. See id. at 534.
70. See RONALD DWOwKIN, TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY28 (1977) (asserting that "principles
play an essential part in arguments supporting judgments about particular legal rights and
obligations").
71. This response is clearly not the place to develop the legal realist argument. For a
short presentation ofmy views on it, see Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis,
16 QUnwiNPiAC L. REV. 339 (1996).
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does a Senator who votes to deny Mitchell his seat on the Supreme
Court.72 This result does indeed follow from the thinness of the thin
Constitution, but it does not, in my view, demonstrate that the thin
Constitution is not law. Or, to restate the jurisprudential point, the
fact that the thin Constitution does not settle disputes does not
establish that the thin Constitution is not law because law cannot
do what Professor Whittington asks of it-settle disputes (in the
relevant sense).7"
My emphasis on the contemporary construction of retrospective
narratives of national continuity explains why I think that Professor
Mandel's criticism is misplaced. We construct our narratives today
although they look to the past. As I acknowledge in Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts, political theory imposes no duty
on us to ensure continuity with the past. 4 We should simply
abandon the search for a connection to the past and rely entirely on
the general defense of constitutionalism I have already outlined if
we thought that the best narrative of national continuity was the
bleak one described by Professor Mandel. 5 I argued, in contrast,
that the best narrative we can construct would be complex, incorpo-
rating the history that Professor Mandel describes. Such a narrative
is likely to be better than the denatured, celebratory narrative that
Professor Mandel fears might emerge, because it will provide a
firmer foundation for the forward-looking projects in which the
people engage.76
A complex narrative of national continuity need not reproduce the
status quo or perpetuate nativism, either. As I suggested in my
comments on American national identity in Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts, one can describe us as a self-transforming
people, recurrently incorporating immigrants into the people,
72. See Whittington, supra note 39, at 534.
73. Professor Whittington correctly points out that using Governor Orval Faubus's
opposition to the desegregation of Little Rock's schools as an example of an action that could
not be connected to the thin Constitution was underdeveloped, see Whittington, supra note
39, at 535, and I agree that one might generate an account of states' rights that connected the
discretion Faubus exercised to the thin Constitution's principles. I disagree, however, that
segregation could be directly defended as consistent with the thin Constitution's principles.
74. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 183-85.
75. See Mandel, supra note 18. It might be that the general defense of constitutionalism
would produce some results different from those produced by creating a narrative of national
continuity around the thin Constitution, although the thinness of the latter suggests that the
differences would have to be rather small.
76. I drew the analogy to processes of personal self-understanding, in which an
individual's ability to go forward is enhanced by his or her appreciation of the bad side of his
or her personality as exhibited in past behavior. See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 184.
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expanding the domain of citizenship, and treating previously
undervalued citizens with increasing respect." As Rogers Smith
emphasizes, this description competes with one in which national
self-identity is manipulated by politicians who seek parochial
advantage in a nativism that takes the American character as
already formed and unalterable." As this indicates, Smith under-
stands that claims about national self-identity are weapons in
political struggle. They are weapons available to both sides,
however. Smith points out that we see ourselves as self-transform-
ing when other politicians seek their own advantages from offering
us that description.79 As a result, we have available to us a national
identity that is not tied to the status quo or to a nativist national-
ism, althoughwe may choose some other description (wrongly, in my
view). The possibility of seeing ourselves as self-transforming is
enough to demonstrate that my argument does not necessarily have
the troubling biases critics might find in it.
As with the entire argument, here too I have to insist that there
are no guarantees. Constructing a narrative of national continuity
is, at its heart, a rhetorical enterprise. That is why Abraham
Lincoln plays such a large role in the book: Lincoln's rhetoric when
he addressed fundamental questions about the Constitution is
among the best in our tradition."0 Rhetoric's role in the argument
also explains the important place political leaders have in my
account, because they-among others-are the ones who articulate
the national self-understanding that justifies constitutionalism. But
stressing the role of political leaders immediately opens up the
possibility that we will choose bad leaders rather than good ones,
demagogues rather than "enlightened statesmen," who, James
Madison reminded us, "will not always be at the helm."8 ' I have no
real response to this except Learned Hand's, that if the people are
so misguided as to select demagogues to lead us, we are unlikely to
find much help from any other institution, including a judiciary
committed in principle to protecting human rights.82
77. See id. at 191-92.
78. See id. at 173-74 (discussing work of Rogers Smith).
79. See id.
80. Although James Madison, John Marshall, and Thomas Jefferson sometimes came up
to Lincoln's standard.
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
82. See Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY. PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 155, 164 (Irving Dilliard
ed., 2d ed. 1953) (arguing that "a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no
court can save" (emphasis added)).
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V. CONCLUSION
The comments on Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
presented in this Symposium have deepened my understanding of
my own argument, and have led me to modify it in some respects. I
now understand more clearly than before that the book's project is
to defend a distinctive American constitutionalism. The thin
Constitution, I argue, provides the best narrative of national
continuity, and thereby explains why we as Americans should be
committed to advancing its project, why we as Americans should
take as our goal the increasingly broad realization and implementa-
tion of universal human rights justified by reason.83 In this way a
distinctive American constitutionalism can be connected to Profes-
sor Michelman's more universalistic constitutionalism. We are, I
have argued, a particular people committed to a universal program.
As I put it in Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, this is
"not an entirely unattractive self-understanding."'
83. As Professor Graber's comments suggest, I believe that I have identified the right
vision in Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, but not that I have actually provided
it, because providing the right description is a job for someone with talents other than the
ones I have.
84. TuSHNET, supra note 1, at 53.
